INTRODUCTION
The skills, relationships, and knowledge bound up in a firm's employees have long been recognized as a source of important competitive advantage. 3 Yet as companies increasingly rely the speed of this labor market. 23 Moreover, the impending new Restatement of Employment Law provides further evidence that both legal scholars and practitioners are currently debating the roots and underlying values of the U.S. employment laws, including legal rules that directly implicate employee mobility. 24 This article seeks to add a new dimension to this debate by examining the business law and business ethics aspects of three modern mechanisms for restricting an employee's postemployment mobility either to a competitor or to the employee's own newly formed competing enterprise. The article's structure is as follows: After the Introduction, Part I presents the background and discusses the motivations and incentives for employers to restrict their former employees' professional mobility. Next, Part II discusses the law and the associated public policy concerns of three legal mechanisms for restricting post-employment mobility: covenants not to compete, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, and garden leave. Part III provides a business ethics critique of these mechanisms from the rights, utilitarian, and fairness perspectives. Part IV then presents recommendations for policy makers related to balancing the competing interests involved in restricting employee mobility, as well as suggestions for additional research.
I. BACKGROUND ON EMPLOYEE MOBILITY RESTRICTIONS
Employment mobility is generally supported by public policy and favored by employees. 25 Nevertheless, employers have a valid interest in managing their current and former employees' ability to be professionally mobile. This section considers these sometimes conflicting interests, together with some of the overarching policy issues arising from the legal constraints on employee mobility.
In general, the economic mobility of employees ensures their personal freedom to pursue a livelihood of their choice, in the position where their capabilities will be most productive and where they are most likely to achieve success. 26 Society benefits from maximized productivity, Law) . 25 See generally Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 112 (finding an "emerging trend in the law of employee noncompete agreements" indicating "that courts are generally more inclined to invalidate employee noncompete agreements than under the modern approach and that the law of employee noncompete agreements is becoming more protective of the employee's interest in mobility").
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Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal as well as the dissemination of skills and knowledge, which can contribute to innovation. 27 For instance, some professionals such as lawyers and (in some jurisdictions) physicians, serve a recognized public policy function, which has resulted in a prohibition on non-competition agreements for those types of workers. 28 In recent times, freedom of mobility has become increasingly more important for employees as the new psychological employment contract eschews notions of loyalty and commitment, 29 thereby eliminating the security of long-term employment, pay and promotions based on tenure, and generous pensions for retirement. 30 Instead, as employees shoulder the risks of economic cycles, save for their own retirements, and are paid only what globalized markets will bear, they must focus their efforts on developing the worth of their own human capital in order to ensure the marketability of their labor. 31 Indeed, marketing their labor by switching jobs seems to have a large impact on employees' financial success. A recent economic study found that among college graduates, those making three job changes at optimal points in their career gained wage increases amounting to as much as thirty-two percent compared to a graduate making no job changes. 32 Consequently, restricting employee mobility can have the effect of depressing wage levels. 33 To place this discussion in a contemporary context, we consider the fast-paced modern business world in which a firm's employees hold much of the business knowledge and technological skills required to successfully operate the firm. As high technology and knowledge usage has become increasingly important, firms have come to rely on their employees (in other words, human capital) for their competitive advantage. Firms need to manage the risk 27 Id.; see also supra Part III.B (discussing cost-benefit analysis). 28 Once, an employee's loyalty and commitment to a company provided a sense of identity and meaning-employees were 'company men' . . . . [; however, i]t is increasingly difficult for individuals to find a sense of long-term identity in corporate America. Indeed, in light of this emphasis on self-reliance, the common good seems merely a quaint, nostalgic phrase for today's company man. Thus, the 'company man' has become the 'first man.'"). 30 See Stone, supra note 15, at 572 (discussing how the old employment model arose under the New Deal where "there evolved an employment system comprised of rising longevity-based wages, employer-based health insurance, and employment linked retirement security"). 31 Id. at 570 ("It becomes clear from an examination of the writings of prominent management theorists that corporations are searching to find a way to make the shift away from long-term career employment not only acceptable, but desirable. By promising employees the opportunity to develop their human capital, the new psychological contract tries to do this. Employers promise employability and training so that, in return, employees will see themselves as entrepreneurs marketing their own human capital in a market place."). 
See generally

/ Law and Ethics of Restrictions on an Employee's Post-Employment Mobility 7
of losing this advantage, particularly when those valuable employees depart to work for a competitor 34 and even when that competitor is located halfway around the world.
35
A recent example from the technology sector drives this point home. The Wall Street Journal reported how Google, Inc. unveiled its Google Wallet and Google Offers concepts in advance of a summer 2011 product launch. 36 Like other Google ventures into the mobile device market with its Android operating system, these technology products go beyond the company's original core search engine and advertising business model. The so-called digital wallet "will let consumers with Android smartphones pay for goods and services or receive coupons and offers by waving the phone in front of a special reader at the checkout counter." 37 Another story on the same page of the business section that day reported that eBay and its PayPal division filed a lawsuit against Google in a matter related to the very same mobilepayments business activities. 38 Specifically, eBay claims "that Google poached two senior executives . . . who then recruited other employees from eBay [and that] those employees used PayPal trade secrets to develop Google digital commerce products." 39 The lawsuit alleges that one of the former executives "transferred digital documents outlining PayPal's mobile-payment and point-of-sales strategies just days before leaving the company for Google. EBay says those documents were critical to its mobile-payments strategy." 40 In leaving eBay, the executive took not only his personal inalienable human capital but he also allegedly misappropriated trade secrets and shared them with a competitor, breached his fiduciary duties, and violated an agreement not to solicit fellow employees. 41 This dispute illustrates a modern-day dilemma that worker mobility raises for the employers, employees, competitors, and policymakers involved. In a fast-moving business world where knowledge and the individuals who create and use that knowledge are key sources of competitive advantage, the legal mechanisms available to employers have become more important than ever. 42 Indeed, because of their importance and their impact on individual freedom of mobility, the underlying normative justifications for those legal mechanisms upon which courts and legislatures rely are also of great importance. To establish the motivations and stakes involved with issues of employee mobility, this part reviews why employers have significant incentives to attempt to control when their workers end the employment relationship and where they move afterwards.
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As a strategic matter, employers will seek a sustainable competitive advantage over their business rivals. 43 In recent years business law scholars have recognized the important role of law in achieving competitive advantage in recent years. 44 The broad applicability of this concept is demonstrated by the proliferation of scholarship in both the business law 45 and management literatures 46 that discusses the role of law in creating competitive advantage. To the extent that human capital is a source of sustainable competitive advantage in its business model, a firm will compete in part by seeking to exclude the human capital of its employees from use by competitors. 47 In effect, a strategic employer may want to treat the human capital (i.e., the employee) as a rivalrous and excludable private good. For instance, a firm may develop a technological advantage in the form of a factory machine that belongs exclusively to the firm. Those ownership rights mean the firm can exclude others from the using the machine. The technology in the machine may be patentable, in which case the firm could gain a time-limited monopoly to exclude others from utilizing it. In addition, the unique and valuable technological knowledge and processes used to create a product may qualify as a legally protected trade secret.
However, human beings are obviously not some sort of transferable, technological commodity owned by firms-despite modern employees' key role as a repository of valuable intellectual property. 48 An undeniable prohibition on slavery or involuntary solitude makes it clear that employees are free to leave a job, under at-will employment or under an employment contract, and cannot be forced to work. 49 While employed, the individual owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer. 50 This duty of loyalty will provide the employer with some comfort 
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that an employee will not engage in activities like competition to the employer's detriment (and potential legal recourse if the duty is breached). Employers will, however, seek to use other legal means to diminish the ability of their workers to leave and engage in damaging competition. An initial tactic for employers is to claim ownership of a piece of knowledge in a way that it can be separated from the employee and, thus, restricted from use by that employee without the employer's permission. 51 Examples of proprietary knowledge ownership held by an employer would be patent rights or, perhaps less defined, rights in propriety trade secrets. Both patent protection, with all of its formal requirements and federal approval, and trade secret law, which arises circumstantially, are separate areas of law outside of the employer-employee relationship.
It also is true that knowledge is not bounded in the same way as other economically exploitable assets; rather, as compared to other knowledge resources, ideas are unique in that they lack of boundaries.
52 Because business-valuable knowledge can be easily diffused and may lose value as it becomes dispersed, employers may try to restrict access to information such as trade secrets, and they may be more comfortable with doing that by contract instead of relying on intellectual property protections. 53 In addition, employers will also make efforts to protect other proprietary information that may not rise to the level of a protectable trade secret, such as a client list.
Using contracts to achieve competitive advantage, 54 employers may utilize a variety of contractual tools to manage what, from their perspective, is undesirable knowledge diffusion. Short of directly impacting employee mobility by contract, as discussed below in the context of covenants not to compete and garden leave, employers may use contracts to supplement the default legal framework for trade secret protection in their jurisdiction. For example, employeeexecuted nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements are contractual provisions that restrict the transfer of information and are beyond the default rule of an employee's duty of loyalty. 55 These agreements seek to stop knowledge flows to competitors; however, they do not by themselves restrict an employee from engaging in competition or necessarily address employee mobility. In addition, unlike some contractual restrictions such as covenants not to compete, "[c]onfidentiality agreements . . . are enforceable even in states in which anti-competition clauses are prohibited." 56 This section has described employer motivations to restrict knowledge transfer to competitors. The next part lays out three legal mechanisms for restricting such knowledge transfer: the covenant not to compete, garden leave, and the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. Each legal restriction raises important ethical questions because these mechanisms directly address an employee's freedom of mobility after the employment relationship has ended.
II. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR RESTRICTING EMPLOYEE MOBILITY
In this part, we examine three illustrative legal mechanisms used by employers to restrict the post-employment mobility, and thus freedom, of their workers. In turn, we discuss each concept along with the relevant legislation and case law that further explains how the mechanism is applied in various jurisdictions. This descriptive discussion sets the stage for Part III, where the business ethics and philosophical analysis of each concept leads to conclusions about the best use, if any, of these legal tools.
A. Noncompetes
The most widely used contractual tool for restricting an employee's post-employment mobility is the covenant not to compete. 57 The covenant not to compete (also called a non-competition agreement or, simply, a noncompete) comes in two types. First, it may create restrictions on post-employment competition with the employer if it is agreed to by either a former employee. Second, a former owner who has sold the goodwill of the business may agree not to compete with the new owner. Non-employment-related covenants that fall into this second category include restrictive covenants that are often included in franchise agreements. 58 In either the post- employment or sale of a business instance, the contract restricts, for a specified time and scope, the otherwise legally permissible activities of the individual. For our purposes, we discuss only the former employee situation because of our emphasis on the ethical implications of restricting employee mobility; although other situations, such as with franchisees, may still implicate an individual's freedom of mobility and resulting ethical issues.
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While noncompete enforcement is, on its face, an anticompetitive tactic, courts will allow enforcement when the restrictions are reasonable and legitimate business interests are being protected. 60 Moreover, by definition, the post-employment noncompete that is pertinent to this article is a separate contract or contract provision between an employer and an individual employee. When accepting the noncompete the employee is voluntarily agreeing to restrictions on her otherwise lawful post-employment activities. The terms of the noncompete, thus, go beyond an employee's duty of loyalty and other fiduciary duties that apply only during the employment relationship but not after.
For example, in Mohr v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. the plaintiff-employees had signed a "noncompetition covenant" with their former employer and a successor entity. 61 The agreement provided they "would not compete with the Mellon Corporation with any similar investment business within 50 miles of any city or town listed on a schedule to the Agreement from the later of five years from the date of closing [of the sale of the original entity-employer] or twelve months after termination . . . ." 62 The agreement also included language that indicated the employees understood that its violation would threaten the employer's valuable goodwill, as well as a provision that memorialized the parties' sense of the covenant's presumed reasonableness. 63 In addition, as other cases demonstrate, standard non-competition agreements are often included alongside provisions addressing post-employment confidentiality, nonsolicitation of clients, and nonsolicitation of fellow employees, all of which prohibit postemployment activities that, absent these contractual terms, would otherwise be permissible. 64 compete with the franchise system it is entering, either during the term of the franchise agreement or for a period following termination of the agreement, or both.' These noncompete agreements are one of the best means available to a franchisor to protect its interest in its trademarks, service marks, trade secrets, processes, and other confidential business information." (endnote omitted)). For a detailed discussion of restrictions found in non-competition covenants in the franchise context, see generally Robert W. 62 Id. at 12. 63 Id. at 13-14. 64 See, e.g., Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2010). In Zambelli, a fireworks company had the employee-defendant sign a noncompete that included several typical restrictive covenant provisions, including the following: 1. A clause prohibiting Wood from 'engag [ing] in any manner in the pyrotechnic business' within the Continental United States or taking any position of employment with any company engaged in the sale or production of pyrotechnic displays for a period of two years after leaving Zambelli; When looking at the legitimate interests at stake, the courts will also consider the nature and significance of the employee's skills. The New York Court of Appeals has pointed out, "[i]n general, we have strictly applied the rule to limit enforcement of broad restraints on competition" and, in specific cases, have "limited the cognizable employer interests under the first prong of the common-law rule to the protection against misappropriation of the employer's trade secrets or of confidential customer lists, or protection from competition by a former employee whose services are unique or extraordinary." 65 As is the case in New York, some states evaluate whether an employee possesses such an extraordinary skill and expertise that a strict imposition of post-employment restrictions is necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition. 66 However, not all jurisdictions require such expertise and knowledge on the part of the employee.
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In the vast majority of jurisdictions that do enforce noncompetes, courts will use a reasonableness test. A typical articulation of the reasonableness standard comes from New York's high court, the New York Court of Appeals, in BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg. 68 There the court stated the common reasonableness test as follows: 
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The modern, prevailing common-law standard of reasonableness for employee agreements not to compete applies a three-pronged test. A restraint is reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. A violation of any prong renders the covenant invalid.
69
Pursuant to one form or another of the reasonableness test, the majority of U.S. jurisdictions will enforce noncompetes to some extent. 70 Research shows that most states have what can be construed as a moderate level of noncompete enforcement. 71 There are, however, states that impose a virtual ban on noncompetes.
72 Most famously, California has a strong, longstanding position in favor of employee freedom and against noncompetes, and the state's courts have continually upheld the ban based on public policy grounds. 73 However, jurisdictions that allow post-employment noncompete enforcement will apply some version of the reasonableness test coupled with an evaluation of the stakeholders' interests. 74 These states use 69 Id. at 1223 (citation omitted). The court went on to write:
New York has adopted this prevailing standard of reasonableness in determining the validity of employee agreements not to compete. "In this context a restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee." In fashioning the [reasonableness] analysis, New York courts have endeavored to balance public policy concerns relating to the benefits of competition and the unfettered flow of talent and ideas in our economy with employers' legitimate right to protect the fruits of their labor, the idea being that the proper balancing of these factors will produce the most wealth and innovation . . . for society. It is important to keep in mind, however, that on a less grand scale the interests to be balanced are those of the individual employer and employee.
Id. (quoting
Id. at 533-34 (citation omitted). proposed legislation, Illinois's version of noncompete reform seeks to formalize the bounds of the traditional reasonableness test by requiring the contract to be "narrowly tailored to support the protection of a legitimate business interest" and apply it to specific levels of employees. Id. The proposal also provides for rebuttable presumptions "that a that a restrictive covenant is not narrowly tailored to promote a legitimate business interest if":
(i) the covenant's duration exceeds one year; (ii) the covenant's geographic area extends beyond any region in which the key employee provides employment services during the one year preceding termination of the employment relationship; or (iii) the type of services covered by the covenant extends beyond the nature of the work performed by the key employee.
Id.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.50 (2010)
80 The Colorado statute is titled "Unlawful to intimidate worker -agreement not to compete," and declares that "[i]t shall be unlawful to use force, threats, or other means of intimidation to prevent any person from engaging in any lawful occupation at any place he sees fit." COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(1) (2010). However, subsection (2) provides several exceptions to this ban on noncompetes. Specifically, section (2) states:
Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any person to receive compensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any employer shall be void, but this subsection (2) shall not apply to: (a) Any contract for the purchase and sale of a business or the assets of a business; (b) Any contract for the protection of trade secrets; (c) Any contractual provision providing for recovery of the expense of educating and training an employee who has served an employer for a period of less than two years; disfavor noncompetes or ban them with significant exceptions. In addition, new research related to the effects of noncompetes has started to create a picture of the role of these mobilityinhibiting contracts, which further sheds light on the possible economic role of restricting employee mobility.
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The post-employment implications of noncompete enforcement are clear for an affected employee. 82 He is limited-at least for an amount of time and a geographic or topical scope that a court finds to be reasonable-from going to work for a competitor of his former employer or from starting a competing business. While an employee who is subject to an enforceable noncompete is prohibited from moving to a new position that is contrary to the terms of the contract, the employer has, at least in theory, already provided its consideration to support the agreement. 83 In other words, the former employer does not normally have any additional obligations once the terms of the noncompete are triggered by the termination of employment.
Again, policymakers acknowledge that noncompetes are by nature anticompetitive and would normally be unenforceable as against public policy.
84 Accordingly, most state courts will allow a covenant not to compete, but "only if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the public interest." 85 While the details vary by jurisdiction, legitimate protectable business interests may include investments in training and building the employee's reputation; confidential and proprietary information, such as customer lists and strategies; and client relationships. 86 In effect, most states recognize (d) Executive and management personnel and officers and employees who constitute professional staff to executive and management personnel. 83 Some states do not require additional consideration when a noncompete is signed after employment has begun under a theory that continued employment or some additional terms or conditions of employment, such as a promise to modify an at will employment assumption, are sufficient. See, e.g., Lake Land Emp't Grp. of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 2004) (resolving a split in the state appellate courts by concluding that an employee continuing with an at-will employment relationship is sufficient consideration to support assent to a noncompete); Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ohio 1991) (finding that a noncompete signed upon employer's promise to formerly at-will employee to discharge the employee only for specified causes is sufficient consideration). However, other states may require new independent consideration to support a noncompete for continuing at-will employees but not for employees who are terminable for good cause, for whom mere continued employment is sufficient consideration. In summary, even if a noncompete will lessen otherwise lawful competition and potentially inhibit the flow of knowledge, most states today will allow this compromise. Noncompetes can be controversial and have been consistently disputed in litigation. Because noncompetes create the risk that employers will overreach and improperly shift costs to employees, the next sections discuss two alternative mechanisms that may still protect the employer's interests, but have a more negative impact on employee's freedom of mobility.
Id. § 8-2-113(2).
B. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
A relatively resurgent concept that has yet to gain much traction in U.S. jurisprudence is the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 88 The thrust of the concept is the assumption that a former employee who was privileged to acquire an employer's confidential information or trade secret will inevitably use or disclose the knowledge in her new employment. 89 Therefore, a judicial injunction is sought to prohibit the employee from beginning the new employment based on allegations of a threatened misappropriation, coupled with irreparable harm and, to some extent in various jurisdictions, bad faith. 90 Essentially, a handful of states allow an employer to argue, even in the absence of a noncompete agreement, to "enjoin a departing employee from taking a job on the grounds that he or she will 'inevitably disclose' some unspecified trade secret." 88 The doctrine also has not seen much treatment in the academic literature. Following resurgence in the debate over inevitable disclosure and its wider application to address threatened trade secret misappropriation in the mid 1990s, several student notes and comments addressed the topic. Because PepsiCo believed Redmond would inevitably disclose confidential information and trade secrets related to pricing and marketing plans it brought suit and, eventually, was granted an injunction based on a theory of inevitable disclosure.
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While injunctive relief based on an inevitable disclosure theory may be rare, one can imagine an employer arguing for inevitable disclosure-based injunctive relief as part of the irreparable harm contemplated by a court when evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction. 95 A court could be more amenable to the argument that irreparable harm will occur initially during a time-sensitive and short-term relief of a temporary restraining order. In contrast, a long-term permanent restraining order seems less likely because of the potentially open-ended mobility restriction that would result. This concern would be particularly troubling if there were assurances that the trade secret will not be conveyed, perhaps because of an existing and enforceable nondisclosure agreement.
However, where there is evidence of wrongdoing or behavior consistent with the misappropriation of trade secrets, a court may be more likely to restrict the departing employee's choice of mobility under a theory of inevitable disclosure. For instance, in Bimbo Bakeries, Inc. v. Botticella, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to review a trade secret misappropriation case where a departing executive was one of only a few individuals with access to the plaintiff's trade secret, the process for creating famous Thomas' English Muffins "nooks and crannies." 96 In the absence of a noncompete (presumably because the original employment had been in California), the appellate court reviewed the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting the employee from working for a competitor. After secretly accepting employment with a competitor, the employee-defendant had continued to work for the plaintiff for some time in a knowledge-sensitive role. 97 Even though the employee had signed a "Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Invention Assignment Agreement," 98 the court upheld the injunction under a theory of inevitable disclosure, at least in the short term. 99 Interestingly, the Bimbo court added that there were multiple issues of public interest at play in such a case, including upholding the sanctity of confidentiality agreements and protecting trade secrets. 100 The court also listed several additional interests, including "a public interest in employers being free to hire whom they please and in employees being free to work for whom 93 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 153. 94 
Id.
95 Some sources assert that only a few states have embraced inevitable disclosure. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 23, at 9 (harshly criticizing New Jersey for allowing inevitable disclosure arguments and stating that perhaps three states subscribe to the inevitable disclosure doctrine). But see Treadway, supra note 88, at 626-49 (finding in 2002 that eight states had adopted the doctrine, four states lacked definitive case law on the subject, six states adopted a limited version of the doctrine, and three states had rejected it outright). 96 Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3rd Cir. 2010). 97 Id. at 105-06. 98 Id. at 105. 99 Id. 100 Id. at 119.
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Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal they please" and citing with approval Pennsylvania precedents that had articulated "a societal interest in employee mobility." 101 As discussed below, criticism of inevitable disclosure from an ethical perspective is perhaps easier than a critique of noncompetes, because the inevitable disclosure logic allows an employer to restrict mobility without ever bargaining or paying for the right to restrict a knowledge transfer, even when that improper knowledge transfer is subconscious. 102 Since it is not a contract-based remedy, an employer seeking inevitable disclosure protection is essentially arguing for a default rule to protect its intellectual property as captured in a trade secret even before there is evidence of misappropriation of that secret. The employer, thus, must ask for a court to determine that a former employee will eventually, even unconsciously, divulge or otherwise use the trade secret in competition. In effect, the remedy is a prohibition on the former employee going to work for a competitor where the trade secret will surely be used sooner or later.
Perhaps worse, the implication is that, with an application of inevitable disclosure, the restriction on mobility is not bounded in time and geographic scope, as is the case with a noncompete term that is subject to a reasonableness test. To the contrary, the information that is the subject of the trade secret in an inevitable disclosure action will be protectable-and thus the grounds to prevent the employee from moving freely-for some indefinite period that could be as long as the information remains a bona fide trade secret giving firm a competitive advantage.
Having discussed our concerns thus far with the doctrine of inevitable disclosure and covenants not to compete, we now turn to garden leave, a less well-known contractual tool that also is designed to restrict employee mobility.
C. Garden Leave
Garden leave, also sometimes called gardening leave, is a relatively new mechanism for limiting post-employment mobility. Originally a concept in British law, there is some evidence it is beginning to be used in the United States.
103 Like a noncompete, but unlike the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, garden leave is a contract-based restriction on mobility, which results from the parties' negotiation. There are few discussions of garden leave in the U.S. academic 101 Id. (citing Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1960)). 102 See Robin Feldman, The Role of the Subconscious in Intellectual Property Law, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 12-14 (2010) (commenting that inevitable disclosure may initially appear to conflict with a trade secret approach to limiting knowledge transfer, but that "[w]ith general skills and knowledge, the law recognizes the difficulty of limiting the subconscious, declaring the information beyond the bounds of trade secret law and giving the employee free reign to use the information in a new job"). Feldman adds that, in the case of inevitable disclosure, "the law also recognizes the difficulty of limiting the subconscious, but this time, it drastically limits the employee's freedom, restricting the employee from taking a related job." Id. at 13. 103 See generally Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2002) ("Garden leave may provide a solution to the prevailing uncertainty regarding the enforceability of restrictive covenants in the United States. Whether it will do so is a question that remains to be answered. Having observed the efficacy of such provisions across the Atlantic, many American employers in competitive industries have begun putting garden leave clauses into the contracts of their own key employees in hope that these provisions will prove to be more reliably enforceable than have the traditional post-employment restrictive covenants. As yet, however, American courts have not ruled on the legitimacy of garden leave provisions.").
literature, 104 although both media 105 and practitioners 106 have noted its increasing use by U.S. employers for various types of employees.
In the case of garden leave, "the employee agrees to give notice some months prior to departure-say, six months-during which period the employer must pay the employee's salary but may choose not to assign any duties, and in any event may prevent the employee from working elsewhere."
107 Thus, rather than leaving the employer and immediately beginning work for a competing enterprise, the employee is paid to remain at home and, at least metaphorically, work only in her garden. Accordingly, garden leave serves as a "means of avoiding the restraints on specific performance" because "the employer . . . contract[s] for a relatively long period of notice by the employee to terminate the employment, and . . . pay[s] the employee's salary during this period without requiring the employee to come into work . . . on the assumption that the employee will have to stay home and work in the garden, but will be financially secure until the period of notice expires and he or she is then free to work for the competitor."
108
Garden leave is like a noncompete in that it protects an employer's interest in information by limiting employee mobility, but it has the extra advantage of forcing the employer to bear those costs, post-employment, which compensates the employee. Thus, because the employer has an immediate and tangible cost to restricting mobility, the employer will refrain from using garden leave to restrict the mobility of lower-level employees who do not really have confidential knowledge. Moreover, employers will avoid paying garden leave even to top managers for longer than is necessary to protect valuable knowledge. It is, therefore, less subject than a noncompete to the criticism that an employee's right to earn a living is ignored.
The uncertainty and troublesome aspects of noncompetes have, not surprisingly, made the garden leave option more attractive in some ways to protect both employer and employee interests. As one set of practical advice from corporate lawyers has framed these issues:
American courts usually enforce noncompetes only when they are reasonable and protect an employer's legitimate business interest. As many courts value free mobility of employees and open and fair competition, courts are commonly cautious when deciding 104 An August 2011 search of all law journals for all available years in the LexisNexis database reveals only about 15 scholarly articles mentioning garden leave in a substantive manner, and several of those exclusively deal with the Australian or British legal systems. Most of these articles merely cite a 2002 student note by Greg Lembrich. See id. At the time of that article, Lembrich's research indicated, "American courts have not ruled on the legitimacy of garden leave provisions." Id. at 2293. He added that "American commentators have also been slow to address garden leave as a potential solution to the problem [of uncertain noncompete enforcement]" and that only a few U.S. practitioner articles had addressed the subject. Id. at 2293 n.5. the scope and/or enforceability of noncompetes. This uncertainty has created an environment where employers may be unable to sufficiently protect their interests against departing, well-trained, highly productive employees. A "garden leave provision" may effectively protect the legitimate interests of the business while not causing a financial hardship to the employee.
109
In light of the potential mutual benefits to both employers and employees provided by garden leave, and because it is less controversial than noncompete restrictions, these provisions may prove to be a popular alternative to other mobility-inhibiting mechanisms. 110 Accordingly, how to determine the proper public policy balance between protecting employee mobility and regulating sensitive knowledge flows through endorsing noncompetes, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, or garden leave remains an open question for courts and legislatures. In the next section, we go beyond simply examining the legal enforcement and business efficiency questions about restricting employees' post-employment mobility and address questions about the business ethics of such restrictions.
III. AN ETHICS CRITIQUE OF RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYEE MOBILITY
Lawmakers drafting legislation addressing employee mobility restrictions, as well as judges officiating in litigation to enforce them, may allude to various philosophical arguments in determining the reasonableness and public policy impacts of such measures. For example, the first step of the three-pronged test for reasonableness of noncompetes 111 evaluates whether legitimate business interests are implicated, alluding to the existence of competing property rights. 112 The second step assesses hardship on the employee, 113 which suggests that concerns over fairness and equity may be at issue. 114 The final step considers the effect on the general public, 115 indicating the relevance of a utilitarian analysis-weighing the social costs and benefits of enforcing a noncompete. 116 However, lawmakers and judges may not have 109 Lewis & Kowal, supra note 106, at S-12. 110 See, e.g., Lembrich, supra note 103, at 2314-19 (discussing several reasons why U.S. courts may find enforcing garden leave provisions preferable to enforcing noncompetes). 120 This natural property right that all persons have in their labor is necessary for subsistence and arises from every person's natural right to self-preservation. 121 Locke finds there is not only an individual right to self-preservation but there is also an obligation on others to respect each person's right to self-preservation. Locke derives this right for self-preservation from the argument that humans were created as God's servants, to survive at His pleasure rather than at one another's pleasure. 122 For purposes of self-preservation, mankind has the right to procure from the commons the food and drink and whatever else is necessary for survival. 123 Thus, according to Locke, there is a moral basis for individuals to have property interests in their own bodies and labor, the returns of which naturally belong to those individuals.
When it comes to one's property rights in one's self, Locke suggests that under the terms of natural law, "man . . . cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another . . . ." 120 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 18. 121 Id. at 4-5 ("Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully; so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another."). 122 Id. at 4 ("[N]o one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure."). 123 Id. at 17-18 ("Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence . . . .").
services for wages, which "gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater, than what is contained in the contract between 'em."
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In this way, the concept of freedom to contract becomes relevant in Locke's philosophy, as well as the strict interpretation of contractual terms. During the time of the contract between master (employer) and servant (employee), Locke indicates that the labor of the servant belongs completely to the master: "Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; . . . become my property. . . . The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them."
127 These clauses are relevant to a consideration of legal restrictions on employee mobility from a rights-based ethical framework.
The master's (employer's) ownership of the product of the servant's (employee's) labor is well recognized today. Modern scholars acknowledge that businesses can have property rights in the capital, technology, and information used by employees to contribute productively to the business, as well as property rights to the results of the employee's production. 128 Nevertheless, Werhane suggests that property rights are secondary to more fundamental moral rights, such as freedom and the equal opportunity to self-development. 129 These more fundamental rights may bring about the necessity for compromise when it comes to protecting property rights. These considerations are relevant in the evaluation of public policy on legal restrictions to employee mobility, as discussed in the following sections.
Noncompetes
Under Locke's concept of freedom to contract labor services, individuals are free to agree to contractual terms detailing the duration and extent of the relationship between master and servant. When it comes to noncompetes, however, what is at issue is the ownership and deployment of the productive capacity represented by the employee's knowledge, skills, and talents beyond the termination of the labor contract. Noncompetes controversially allow the former employer to assert a continuing right in restricting the employee's use of that productive capacity after the employee is no longer working for that employer, nor receiving continued compensation, nor bound by the normal common law duties of loyalty to a current employer. 130 Obviously, this continuing, postcontractual right is quite valuable to the employer, intent on reducing the threat of competition after an employment contract is terminated and an employee has departed. But noncompetes can also be beneficial to employers even while the employment contract is still in force. Noncompetes allow the employer to increase the predictability of access to an important resource, in this case a human resource, by raising the opportunity cost of the employee leaving to work for a competitor. 131 In other words, this is a strategy for reducing the "flight risk" of valuable employee assets. Accordingly, with the greater certainty of staffing that comes with an enforceable noncompete, an employer is more likely to invest in the employee by investing in valuable human capital.
132
Noncompetes are also important to employers in that they can be used defensively when they contain antipoaching or antiraiding provisions that not only prohibit a former employee from competing, but also prevent the employee from eviscerating the former employer's staff by luring away the best and brightest workers.
An additional argument supporting these restrictions is that a noncompete is a contract clause that, like any contractual issue, is binding only upon mutual consent. Locke suggests that an individual has the freedom to consent to any agreement to sell her labor services-that is, to become a servant to a master, or an employee to an employer. 133 Where consent is given, the fruits of the employee's labor belong to the employer to the full extent of the agreed upon contractual terms. 134 The initial question that begs to be answered is, how does one define consent? Locke asserts natural law limits on the freedom to contract at the point where doing so would involve consenting to arbitrary constraints on an individual's right to liberty, such as constraints amounting to enslavement or constraints on an individual's right to subsistence and self-preservation. 135 As has been noted, the definition of consent can be troublesome because consent comes very close to coercion when one agrees to go along with an action due to lack of information or simply because no other feasible option is available. 136 Yet as discussed below, because of unequal bargaining power, employees often find they are required to sign nonnegotiable, boilerplate noncompetes if they want to keep their jobs.
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Professor Richard Epstein has evaluated how Locke's concepts of property rights in one's labor and the freedom to contract out one's labor to others underlie U.S. employment law.
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Under freedom of contract, there may be an assumption that employers and employees agree to complete contracts, with all the terms fully negotiated, understood, and spelled out. 139 To what extent would an employee truly understand the value of her skills at some unspecified point in the future? Even if the employee were to have full awareness of the rights she is giving away in a noncompete, there is the question of whether the employee has an equal and free ability to negotiate these terms. As discussed below, several critiques have been put forward regarding the employee's consent to waive of future rights, as occurs with a noncompete. Next, we will consider how a rights-based perspective might weigh in on these debates. Freedom of contract assumes that the terms of a contract are freely negotiated. However, in the current employment context, the terms of a noncompete are not necessarily open for negotiation. As such,
The new model of private ordering in employment relies on boilerplate documents, unilaterally drafted by the employer and presented as a condition of employment, often subsequent to the start of work. Their purpose is not to memorialize a negotiated set of terms, but to extract waivers of rights, thus realigning statutory and default rules to better reflect employers' interests.
140
Stone suggests that earlier in history, courts were very suspicions of noncompetes in employment relationships because "they were often the result of vastly uneven bargaining power and thus contracts of adhesion." 141 The tides have shifted, though, and many authors have discussed the legal and ethical implications of differences in bargaining power between employees and employers.
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Many factors may limit an employee's ability to negotiate the terms of a noncompete agreement. For example, the employer's timing in proffering the noncompete may affect the balance of bargaining power. As Arnow-Richman notes, the employer can require the employee regarding job security are much stronger than the rights reflected in the terms of their contracts, based on an empirical exploration comparing employees' assumptions about their employment contracts to the actual legal contractual terms). Noncompete clauses also may be proffered at the end of an employment relationship. Which party holds the stronger bargaining power could completely depend upon the circumstances-for instance, whether the employer or employee is about to terminate the relationship. Where the employee is planning to move on to another job, she may have little incentive to offer the employer any protection against unfair competition. But, where the employee has been fired, the employer holds all the bargaining power, and the employee may be fully cognizant of the hardship that a noncompete may bring as she anticipates a stretch of time without employment in her chosen field. 150 Some argue that public policy does not favor limitations of employee mobility; however, evidence suggests that litigation to enforce noncompetes is more prevalent than ever before, and courts are more likely than before to uphold them. 151 Given the implications of a knowledgebased economy, 152 there is little surprise that courts might favor employers' interests to a greater extent. Further, emboldened by their strong negotiating position employers may draft extensive noncompete clauses, which if reviewed in litigation, might be found unreasonable by the courts. In states where "blue-penciling" contract modification is permitted, there is no risk to the employer who overreaches because courts will not throw out an unreasonable noncompete, but rather will redraft the clause to comport with what the court finds to be reasonable. 153 Where boilerplate noncompete terms are used and the employee's costs of challenging the noncompete restrictions in court, as well as the uncertainty of the outcome of a judge's decision, are both unbearably high, this might have a chilling effect on any employee's interest in fighting against the terms or seeking alternative employment in their field.
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Regardless of when the noncompete was signed by the parties, the enforcement of a noncompete is triggered only at the point of a decision, on either side, to end the employment relationship. At that point, the employee may acquiesce to the terms of the agreement without a fight or ignore it, causing the employer to go to court to enforce the noncompete. 155 The court process can be lengthy and costly for both parties, and the court's determination of what is reasonable in the circumstances can produce an outcome that neither party expected. Thus, in any particular circumstance where parties sign a noncompete agreement, the actual impact of the clause and, therefore, what the employer and employee are consenting to would be more and more uncertain the farther removed the parties are from the point of both contract signature and the triggering event. 150 
Id.
151 Bishara, supra note 72, at 290 n.6. 152 See Bishara & Orozco, supra note 51. 153 See Bishara, supra note 71, at 776-77. 154 See Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 
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The rights-based perspective may not anticipate the difficulties of the nature of consent versus coercion, because freedom to contract is arguably natural right to be exercised by individuals as equals. 156 In a master-servant relationship such as that of an employer-employee, the contract transfers powers over the servant to the master, to the extent of the time period and other terms consented upon by parties to the contract. Even with consent, under a rights-based perspective the actual outcome may be bounded by the party's absolute and fundamental rights, such as Locke's preclusion against enslaving oneself 157 and the right prioritized by Werhane to self-development. 158 Thus, the weaknesses of noncompetes from the rights-based perspective include (1) a failure to resolve the issues of employee consent versus coercion to protect against employer overreaching; (2) questions about the employee's ability to develop herself and make a living from her property rights in her own productive capability; and (3) a failure to gain certainty about protection of the employer's property rights to competitive information such as trade secrets. Greater certainty and better protection of the interests of both sides would be more beneficial for society. Next we will consider a rights-based point of view on two other forms of employee-mobility restrictions to determine whether these mechanisms better ensure that interests in certainty and protection of property rights are available to both employers and employees.
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
As discussed above, the inevitable disclosure doctrine results in a judicially enforced injunction giving employers rights to restrict employee mobility beyond the term of the employment contract. 159 The doctrine provides that "employers may enjoin a departing employee from taking a job on the grounds that he or she will 'inevitably disclose' some unspecified trade secret." 160 This doctrine is intended primarily to prevent the employee from revealing information like a trade secret that is the property of the employer, where revelation of that information would decrease its value and/or impair the employer's competitiveness. 161 Accordingly, an employer may restrict a former employee from joining a competitor if disclosure of confidential information would be inevitable in that new employment setting. The doctrine does not specifically have the goal of restraining the productive capacity of the employee, although that is the ultimate effect. Consideration of this doctrine implicates both the rights-based concerns for protecting employer's property rights on the one hand, and the employee's right to selfdevelopment on the other.
Where the employer has invested efforts in developing the information as valued property (e.g., trade secrets) and relies upon the property for continued competitiveness, Lockean analysis would support the employer's right to protect that property from the encroachment of others.
Locke posits that ownership requires continued use of property. 163 Thus, when at issue is the employer's company information related to its competitive strategy, Lockean analysis could be used to defend measures to protect that property.
Alternatively, because the ultimate effect of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is to hinder the former employee's ability to use his skills in the type of work that may be his highest productive capacity, this doctrine bumps up against two important rights considerations: first, the right of individuals to protect their own self-preservation and, second, the freedom of contract as applied to the terms of the master-servant relationship. 164 Criticism of inevitable disclosure is perhaps even easier than critiques of noncompetes because the inevitable disclosure logic allows an employer to restrict mobility without ever bargaining or paying for the right to restrict a knowledge transfer. As discussed above, Locke specifies that an agreement to sell one's services gives the "master" limited power only as contained in the contract. 165 Given that the inevitable disclosure doctrine gives the employer powers over the employee that are not covered by an agreement between them, Locke's view of freedom to contract would be undermined by the employer's ability to restrict employment opportunities under the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 166 Moreover, Locke argues for an individual right to self-preservation, as well as an obligation on others to respect each person's right to self-preservation, and against any attempt to "take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, liberty, health, limb, or goods of another." 167 The rule of inevitable disclosure could potentially be used to block an employee indefinitely from work in his chosen field, for as long as the employer's information (e.g., trade secrets) is protected property. Thus, to the extent the employee's right of selfpreservation is injured by actions of the employer that step beyond the agreed-upon terms of their relationship, a Lockean analysis would find the doctrine of inevitable disclosure lacking.
Garden Leave
The concept of garden leave accomplishes many of the goals sought under the other employee mobility constraints discussed above, without incurring many of the negative impacts on the freedom of contract and the right of self-preservation. Locke's key concern of protecting property rights is ensured yet appropriately limited in duration by the price mechanism. Freedom of contract is promoted in this instance because the details of the garden leave would be set forth in an initial employment contract to which both parties consent. Whereas the noncompete clause provides the employer with unilateral rights and binds the employee with duties, the garden leave agreement generates bilateral rights and duties on the part of both the 30 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal employer and employee. 168 For this reason, garden leave provides mechanisms to protect each party's property rights, while limiting overreaching on either side. The employer's interest in protecting property rights in competitive information is ensured, and that protection lasts only for the period of time that the employer is willing to pay compensation (the price mechanism). The employee preserves her interest in making a living and protecting her rights to her productive capacity in the long run. In the short run, although the employee would not actively use her productive capacity in her chosen field, she would be fairly compensated for that period. Finally, where the contract very clearly establishes the relevant duration of garden leave, there would be a limited role of the state and a lower level of scrutiny in adjudicating the employer-employee relationship.
169 From a Lockean point of view, the garden leave mechanism may be better in preserving the bilateral rights of the individuals involved. Moreover, it is consistent with the Lockean natural rights tradition, "which protects natural property rights and allows the state to restrict them only as necessary to protect the property owner and his property from force and fraud."
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B. Utilitarian View
While a Lockean analysis focuses on individual rights with a limited role for the state, a utilitarian perspective can be used to determine whether employee mobility restrictions are beneficial from a public policy perspective. Utilitarian analysis typically takes an ends-based, rather than means-based view to evaluate the morality of an outcome, with the goal of producing the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. 171 Generally, utilitarian theory applies a cost-benefit analysis not only to the interests of individual parties but also to the overall outcomes for society.
172 Thus, to determine the ethics of mobility restrictions we could weigh the benefit gained by employers, employees, and greater society through permitting the economics literature, 182 as well as business economics and management literature, 183 has engaged in weighing the societal costs versus benefits of noncompetes.
This last area of scholarly work has recently seen an increase in empirical studies measuring the impact, if any, of noncompete enforcement on employee mobility, 184 employee compensation and business investment, 185 and entrepreneurial activity 186 in various business and jurisdictional contexts. The results have been mixed. On the one hand, scholars have suggested that strong enforcement of noncompetes is good for the public interest because it leads to increased employer investment in human capital, which benefits society by leading to a better trained workforce. 187 On the other hand, Alan Hyde has recently interpreted new empirical research on noncompetes to suggest that the economic harm to the restriction of labor mobility and knowledge transfer outweighs any benefits, concluding that all noncompetes should be banned, as in California. 188 Moreover, because of asymmetries in the negotiating position between powerful employers and individual employees, there may be a tendency for employers to overreach in their noncompete terms. 189 In addition, noncompetes are criticized simply for their anticompetitive nature. 190 This is perhaps connected to concerns that noncompetes may cause economic harm via inefficient allocation of resources since these contracts restrict the free and rapid flow of labor. In other words, the criticism is that noncompetes allow one party to unfairly shift the burden of transaction costs related to restrictions to the weaker party, in this case the individual employee who is less able to bear the costs of compliance with the contract. In addition, some commentators perceive that "[t]he heightened scrutiny of employee noncompete agreements reflects some of the fundamental changes taking place in the economy and in the workplace." 191 Specifically, noncompetes are problematic in the context of "the changing nature of the employment relationship, particularly the movement away from the traditional long-term employment relationship typical in the industrial age . . . [and] the benefits of information sharing and employee mobility in the information age economy." 192 executive officers" and finding that about two-thirds include noncompete clauses that restrict CEOs postemployment activities from one to 5 years, with an average duration of 2 years) In summary, states that allow employee noncompetes are, in effect, recognizing a public policy in favor of tempering free competition and mobility, to varying degrees, by allowing parties to contract for certain restrictions. Even if a noncompete will lessen otherwise lawful competition, and potentially inhibit the flow of knowledge, today most states will allow this compromise. However, the employer's extension of contractual control over a competitive human resource comes with potential harm for individual employees who may disproportionately bear the costs of protecting an employer's proprietary information, as well as potentially impeding the development of entrepreneurial competitive ventures.
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
The inevitable disclosure doctrine provides that "employers may enjoin a departing employee from taking a job on the grounds that he or she will 'inevitably disclose' some unspecified trade secret."
193 Accordingly, an employer may restrict a former employee from joining a competitor if disclosure of confidential information would be inevitable in that new employment setting. Since it is not a contract-based remedy, an employer seeking inevitable disclosure protection essentially argues for a default rule to protect her intellectual property as captured in a trade secret. In effect, the employer is asking for a court to determine that a former employee will eventually, even unconsciously, divulge or otherwise use the trade secret in competition. As a result, the remedy is a prohibition on the former employee going to work for a competitor where it is assumed that the trade secret will surely be used sooner or later.
The problems with the doctrine from a utilitarian point of view are similar to the issues mentioned above with noncompete clauses. In fact, critiquing inevitable disclosure is more straightforward than a critique of noncompetes because the inevitable disclosure doctrine empowers an employer to restrict the employee's mobility when the employer did not even bargain for the restriction. 194 The successful employer receives protection from competition indefinitely while the employee's ability to contribute to society by using knowledge and developing skills is limited. 195 Thus the employer reaps all the benefits, while the employee and, indeed, society bear the costs. In addition, inevitable disclosure doctrine constrains competition and may decrease knowledge diffusion that leads to subsequent innovation.
Perhaps worse, the implication is that the restriction on mobility is not bounded in time and scope like a noncompete term, which is subject to a reasonableness test. To the contrary, the information that is the subject of the trade secret in an inevitable disclosure action will be protectable-and thus so too the grounds to prevent the employee from moving freely-as long as the information remains a bona fide trade secret. 196 This could lead not only to a temporary restraining order, causing a break in the employee's career, but also potentially to a permanent restraining order providing that the employee could not go to work for a certain company for a 193 Hyde, supra note 23, at 9. 194 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 48, at 404 (" [C] ourts that grant injunctions in inevitable disclosure cases are in essence creating judicially crafted covenants not to compete. This runs contrary to the most fundamental principles of employment and contract law, as a contract term-one extremely harmful to the employee and quite beneficial to the employer-is forced upon the two parties in the absence of a bargained-for-agreement." (footnote omitted)). 195 See Stone, supra note 141, at 740. 196 Id. specified time. 197 Moreover, this mechanism is obtained by burdening judicial resources and placing extra costs on both parties and on society. The employee is not paid for this required limitation in career opportunities; and, because this is a judicially granted mechanism, the employee and the employer, as well as the judicial system, must endure the time and expense of litigation.
It seems as though the inevitable disclosure method is an attempt to put the champagne cork back in the bottle, a desperate attempt for the employer to protect assets when it neither adequately considered the need for protection ahead of time, nor engaged in adequate dialogue with the employee to resolve the issue to everyone's satisfaction. Proponents of using inevitable disclosure to restrict employee mobility assert that, because it is solely judicially administered, there is assurance that the protection will be granted only in legitimate, reasonable, and limited cases. 198 However, from a public policy standpoint, the contrary argument could be made. The costs and benefits of this mechanism seem stacked in favor of the employer to the detriment of the employee's interests in benefiting from the use of her skills and knowledge, as well as society's interests as a whole in benefitting from an economy based on healthy competition and the diffusion of knowledge that can lead to innovation. If it became the standard mechanism to require judicial intervention to resolve termination of employment when trade secrets are at issue, it could place an enormous burden on judicial resources, without creating a net benefit for society as a whole. 199 One would hope this doctrine would be used only very rarely and cautiously when there are no other options to protect legitimate proprietary business information. It would be preferable for the primary mechanism used to resolve these disputes be one that encourages the parties to negotiate a mutually satisfactory resolution within appropriate limits that does not unduly burden the greater interests of society. This might be the strength of the garden leave mechanism, discussed next. the employee.
Employees' postemployment activities are still restricted; some opportunities may dry up and some employee knowledge may grow stale during the period of enforced idleness. 201 However, she also observes that "the garden leave device has the virtue of forcing employers to internalize the primary cost of restrictions on employees' postemployment activities, and thus to think twice about whether and how long they are willing to do so." 202 Put another way, the obvious cost of paying an employee not to work inserts the discipline of the price mechanism into the employer's decision-making, which provides the employer an incentive to pay to restrict the mobility only of highly valuable employees and to do so for the shortest length of time that will protect valuable knowledge from being transferred immediately.
Even though there are benefits associated with garden leave over noncompetes or inevitable disclosure, there are also drawbacks. The garden leave clause seems less amendable to reasonableness scrutiny by policymakers and may still act as an improper restraint on trade. It may also allow employer overreaching, provided that the employer is willing to pay to overreach. 203 It is still restrictive from a public policy perspective, in that the public is denied the beneficial services, innovation, and knowledge of the worker for a period of time. The worker is not being a productive member of society-even if she is not being denied compensation to refrain from competition. Moreover, though the worker is getting paid to lock up her skills, she is potentially harmed by not having her skills remain sharp and relevant. 204 Shareholders also may complain that the firm is paying someone not to work and receiving no tangible value in return. There are business issues with that type of waste. Nonetheless, this cost is arguably a good investment because it reduces the otherwise likely transfer of time sensitive knowledge, skills, and relationships to a competitor. Finally, garden leave is fundamentally an anticompetitive mechanism that could lead to abuse, albeit perhaps less than the other two.
C. Fairness Analysis
Rawls's ethical theory centers on justice and fairness in the design and evaluation of social institutions. 205 Scholars holding the traditional narrow view of the applicability of Rawls's "basic structure" of society generally reserve Rawlsian analysis for public law issues such as basic constitutional liberties and systems of tax and transfer, rather than private law issues such as provisions of employment contract law. 206 In this view, contracts are seen as a private outcome of promises made between specific parties, where there is little role for an analysis of overall social fairness. However, Rawls's own writings are ambiguous as to which social institutions are appropriately evaluated in terms of fairness in the basic structure. 207 A broader view asserts that Rawlsian analysis of justice as fairness can legitimately be applied to systems of private law such as the body of laws governing contracts. 208 In a Rawlsian analysis, "contract law would be constructed such that, when viewed in conjunction with all other legal and political institutions, it best serves the demands of the principles of justice." 209 For purposes of this discussion, we will take the broader view and use a simplified Rawlsian analysis to explore restrictions on employee mobility as part of the social institution of employment law.
To consider the fairness of various legal institutions controlling the mobility of employees-including contractual noncompete clauses, the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and garden leave-we engage in a Rawlsian thought experiment. Thus we imagine ourselves in the "original position" behind a "veil of ignorance,"
210 not knowing whether we would be an employer seeking to protect business assets from unfair competition, an employee seeking to preserve her freedom of movement, or a start-up firm looking to hire experienced staff. The parties would not know what type of business assets would require protection, nor the nature of the competitive market. Moreover, the parties would not know the skill level of the employee, the nature of the labor market, nor the relative bargaining power of employer and employee.
In this thought experiment, we seek to establish a social order with impartial and rational principles, including the liberty principle, which assumes that all persons are free and equal, 211 and the difference principle, which permits social and economic inequalities as long as the least advantaged members of society are benefitted. 212 The difference principle would not be applied on a transaction-by-transaction basis, rather the idea is to establish "a set of rules that, when applied generally, is instrumental to the overall scheme of legal and political institutions that maximizes the position of the least well-off, as compared to other possible schemes." 213 From behind the veil of ignorance, we want to determine reasonable mechanisms for employers to protect valuable firm assets, such as strategic knowledge and information from unfair competition, which would also protect an employee's ability to sell her labor services in an open market where they would be utilized at their highest value. From a societal perspective we might want to balance the growth and innovation benefits of a high-velocity labor market 214 with a degree of stability and certainty in outcomes. 215 
Noncompetes
As noncompete agreements are contractual clauses that can be negotiated between the parties, they could be ideal for protecting the interests of employers while preserving the rights of employees. But as applied, noncompete clauses are often unilateral mechanisms that force employees to bear the primary burden and that allocate the benefit to established employers. Because the burden of the noncompete is externalized by the employer onto the employee, employers have an incentive to overreach. Thus, in the original position from behind a veil of ignorance, the question arises whether the interests of the most vulnerable populations are protected by this practice. Differences in bargaining power lead to employees signing noncompete clauses that are detrimental to their interests simply because they have limited alternate options. 216 This concern is underlined by instances of noncompete agreements being enforced against involuntarily terminated or low-skilled employees who have few opportunities for alternative employment.
217
The effort by some state legislatures to narrow the applicability of noncompetes to only skilled, high-earning employees is one potential solution, as these individuals are more likely than low-earning employees actually to have access to business information worthy of protection.
218 This solution might be fairer to employees; however, it could potentially increase the anticompetitive impact on society precisely because skilled employees are most likely to innovate and create start-up enterprises. Finally, one negative point for employers is the uncertainty involved in whether proprietary business information will actually be protected because employers are dependent on the courts to enforce noncompetes when employees resist them. Because of these issues, under a Rawlsian analysis, it seems clear that use of noncompete clauses to protect competitive business information would not be the fairest mechanism to any of the parties, particularly to the most vulnerable.
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
In some ways, this doctrine raises even more concerns than noncompetes related to fairness because it does not require prior notice to or the consent of the employee. Nevertheless, some commentators find the inevitable disclosure doctrine superior to noncompetes. 219 The upside of this doctrine is that it is crafted and enforced by judges who can carefully tailor the application of the doctrine to protect specific business information, while allegedly ensuring against overreaching, which can have a chilling effect on an employee's mobility. 220 Thus this doctrine may be more balanced and equitable, with judges assuring the protection of the interests of the most vulnerable.
However, there are several downsides of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. First of all, justice for employers is uncertain as they will not know whether their competitive information will be protected until the resolution of the process. This mechanism is even more dependent on judicial enforcement than noncompetes. For employees who are precluded from employment options as a result of the application of this doctrine, fairness of the outcome may be questionable as the remedy is often not temporary, but rather a permanent injunction. As the new psychological employment contract more frequently asks employees to provide for their own futures and bear the risks of economic cycles, 221 the burden of limited employment options might fall quite heavily on an employee. Thus, looking at the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a social system of employment law, Rawls might find it to fall short in the application of the difference principle. The social and economic inequalities inherent in this mechanism do not tend to maximize the position of the least-advantaged members of society.
Garden Leave
Given that the foundation of a Rawlsian analysis is to find a solution for the structure of society that all parties can agree upon regardless of their position in society, there are many reasons why garden leave might be preferable to the others. There are several benefits of garden leave. First, it is neither unilateral nor court determined, but rather a negotiated agreement, where the benefits and burdens are shared by the employer and employee. While the employer receives protection of proprietary business information for the agreed amount of time, the employee is compensated for the lack of livelihood during that period. The burden is not externalized by the employer (as with noncompetes), but a cost for exercising this mechanism-the cost of the continued salary of the employee-is borne directly by the employer rather than some statebased unemployment insurance. 222 Thus, the party that is usually more vulnerable is afforded greater protection in this case than in any other type of mobility restriction because the employee's livelihood during the relevant period is ensured as part of the mechanism. As a result, an employer has an incentive to tailor and limit the garden leave to only the amount of time that is relevant to the specific position and business knowledge gained by the employee.
When it comes to social impacts, garden leave, like noncompetes and inevitable disclosure, has negative social impacts related to restraints on innovation as a result of limited labor mobility and knowledge transfer. However, with this mechanism it remains possible for the employer to protect resources that it values. Because garden leave involves a negotiated solution that shares costs and benefits between the parties, Rawls's liberty principle supporting threatened misappropriation under confidentiality agreements and trade secret laws. Most importantly, courts would be empowered to prevent employment of a former employee under the inevitable disclosure doctrine." Id.
the freedom and equality of all parties is upheld. For these reasons, while there are still weaknesses, a Rawlsian analysis of employment mobility mechanisms is likely to favor garden leave over other options.
D. Comparison of Mechanisms
We have identified various strengths and weakness of the three mechanisms for restricting employee mobility from the perspectives of rights, utilitarian, and fairness ethical reasoning. These perspectives give a fuller consideration of the three elements of the reasonableness test applied by courts for the enforcement of noncompete clauses.
Two questions remain to be discussed in this article. First, in comparing the analyses of the three mechanisms, while each has shortcomings, is there one mechanism that should be promoted more than the others from a public policy perspective? In other words, on the individual level, which mechanism should an ethical manager choose to use? Second, what improvements can be suggested in the application of each of these mechanisms to counter the problems identified herein? We will wrap up this section on the ethics critique of restrictions on employee mobility by discussing which is the preferable mechanism. Then, we will address the second question in our recommendations in Part IV.
In our assessment, garden leave, which seems to be relatively new to the United States, generally provides an improvement over the existing structure of judicial enforcement of noncompete clauses or the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The main weaknesses of the garden leave doctrine are the required idleness on the employee's part that likely results in a loss of productivity to the detriment of corporate shareholders and society overall, as well as the employee's potential loss of skill sharpness. Nevertheless, from a rights perspective, garden leave seems best to protect the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of both employers and employees. Employers can preserve their property rights to proprietary information. Employees preserve their freedom to exercise and develop their productive capacity. The recognition of rights and obligations of both parties is inherent in the garden leave mechanism and may serve to promote a basis for mutually agreeable compromise, finding a way to protect the important rights of both parties.
From a utilitarian perspective, by protecting the employer's proprietary information only to the extent that the employer is willing to pay the employee to remain idle, the price mechanism inherent in a garden leave provision provides a way to optimize the cost-benefit analysis. This has the benefit of providing the specific degree of security that the employer requires to continue to invest in knowledge development. As a result, the long-run social cost is lessened when the employee is more quickly able to deploy to her desired position, though there is a temporary decrease in productivity during the leave period. Moreover, garden leave also limits the restriction on competition and knowledge diffusion within society to a temporary period, as well as reduces the costs of using scarce judicial resources. From a utilitarian perspective, garden leave may provide greater benefits to the employer, the employee, and to society as a whole, while limiting the costs borne by each party. Thus, garden leave provides for a greater good relative to the other two types of mobility restrictions.
Finally, from a Rawlsian perspective, garden leave is the mechanism most likely to create a social order that ensures equality while protecting the interests of the most vulnerable. The burden of protecting the employer's interest in proprietary information is shared by both parties rather than wholly externalized by the employer because the employer pays the employee for the agreed upon period of idleness during which the employee agrees not to use or develop her skills on behalf of a competitor. This structure of private contract law may result in a more just social order than either of the other two mechanisms.
From a business ethics perspective, while garden leave also has its flaws, it may be most preferable for policymakers, employee interest groups, and managers to encourage the use of garden leave policies. While we provide more specific recommendations below relative to limiting the weaknesses inherent to each of the three employee mobility restriction mechanisms, overall, we assert that legislatures considering regulations on employee mobility restrictions and drafters of the Restatement of Employment Law may wish to consider encouraging garden leave as the preferable mechanism for protecting the interests of both parties and society as a whole. Further, managers seeking to implement ethical business practices may favor garden leave policies above other types of mobility restrictions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS
We have reviewed three mechanisms for restraining employee mobility and protecting employer proprietary information and scrutinized each using various business ethics frameworks. First, we examined these mechanisms from a property rights-based view, which emphasizes the employer's right to protect its business assets and the employee's right of control over her labor. Second, we applied a utilitarian account of the costs and benefits to employers, employees, and society of the three mechanisms. Finally, we applied a Rawlsian perspective to analyze the equity and fairness of each mechanism, with an eye on reducing the negative impact on the most vulnerable individuals in the employment relationship.
Our analysis shows that each mechanism is problematic in its own way. Accordingly, a court or state legislature wishing to advance any of the ideals (achieving fairness, maximizing social benefits, or protecting property rights) needs to recognize the shortcomings of each. In this section, we offer recommendations to policy makers to overcome some of the shortcomings inherent in each of the employee mobility restraint mechanisms, while still recognizing the important of protecting proprietary business information. In general, we suggest that it would be most desirable for all persons concerned (except perhaps litigators who specialize in employment termination lawsuits) if the preferred mechanism protecting business proprietary information would prioritize open communication, mutual understanding, and negotiation between employers and employees rather than unilateral or judicially imposed obligations.
The noncompete mechanism seems to inadequately protect individuals' rights, because of the bargaining asymmetries inherent in the inception of the agreement. Noncompete enforcement is also subject to abuse by employers who are generally in a more powerful bargaining position. For instance, the employer can use the mere threat of litigation over a noncompete to chill the employee's desire to move to a competitor or to start a competing enterprise.
223 Post-employment enforcement also leaves the employee uncompensated by the employer and unable to earn a living working in her preferred position. 224 Essentially, the employer has little cost incentive not to overreach and try to enforce the greatest restriction on mobility possible, at the expense of the employee's property rights.
Noncompete policy can be changed to remedy these issues and better achieve ethical ideals. For example, limiting the level of employee who may be subject to noncompetes might help address property rights concerns. In addition, specific rules limiting the types of business information that may be covered by a noncompete may better ensure that the benefits employers gain by enforcement of noncompetes outweigh the social costs of constrained competition. Finally, the process by which noncompetes are established may be reformed to better achieve fair and equitable outcomes.
All states that permit noncompetes should limit their applicability solely to employees who are most likely to have possession of proprietary business information that is sufficiently valuable to require protection. For instance, proposals in Massachusetts and Illinois seek to limit the type of employees who may be covered by a noncompete to highly-compensated and business-crucial employees. 225 In addition, for over three decades, Colorado's noncompete statute has limited noncompete enforcement to "[e]xecutive and management personnel [,] and officers and employees who constitute professional staff to executive and management personnel."
226 For other jurisdictions interested in limiting the coverage of noncompetes to employees whose mobility to a competitor may be cause for legitimate concern, this coverage could be determined, for example, by setting a limitation based on the employee's rank, salary, or expertise. Along this line of thinking, the type of business information that is protected by noncompetes should be limited to truly proprietary information that is strategically relevant to the firm's competitive competency.
Finally, the process of entering into a noncompete agreement should be regulated to ensure that there is no question that employees fully consent to the noncompete clause. At the outset, when the parties are negotiating all the relevant aspects of the job or of a promotion, such as salary and duties, the employer should be required to disclose the terms that will be required of the employee. Arnow-Richman suggests courts could accomplish this if they simply refused jurisdiction over noncompete agreements that were not signed as part of the primary negotiation for the job.
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While noncompetes can be an important mechanism to protect business proprietary information, limiting them in these ways would cut down on litigation.
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is perhaps even more antithetical to an employeerights or fairness-based ethical perspective. Specifically, the doctrine restricts the postemployment mobility of the employee as does the noncompete, but it does so without clearly defined temporal parameters. The theory is that the trade secret in the employee's possession is always at risk of disclosure if the employee works for a competitor. The doctrine can arise in the absence of a noncompete or any other contractual agreement. Thus, on its own, an imposition of an inevitable disclosure-based injunction prohibits an employee's mobility, requiring neither the employee to consent to the restriction nor the employer to negotiate or pay for it. As a result, the employee cannot work for a competitor-perhaps indefinitely-yet never accepted the restriction nor received compensation for it. The balance clearly shifts to the employer at the expense of the employee's property rights. 225 See supra notes 77-78. 226 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (2010). 227 Arnow-Richman, supra note 137, at 657 (calling for disclosure in employment contracts comparable to that called for in consumer protection law such that "[e]ither through common law or statutory initiative, any term withheld until after the employee's acceptance of the initial offer would be unenforceable if the term could have been provided as part of the hiring process").
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The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is also antithetical to the idea of maximizing social benefit. In terms of the potential benefits to society, this mechanism does not reward businesses that act with foresight to protect business secrets and seek common ground with employees. Rather it rewards firms that have no other way to protect valuable trade secrets. In terms of costs to society, the fact that this doctrine is solely judicially enforced means that if it became a universal practice, significant judicial resources could be tied up in this mechanism (making employment litigators the most satisfied beneficiaries).
To improve this mechanism in a manner to better achieve ethical ideals, the application of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure should be limited. Specifically, courts could ensure greater fairness and equity in the judicial process when applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine by limiting who could be subject to the doctrine (to better protect property rights) and specifying what subject matter it can cover (to maximize benefits while minimizing social costs). As with noncompetes, only high-level employees who are proven to have possession of highlevel proprietary business information should be subject to such injunctions. Further, the employer should have to establish that the information actually possessed by the employee is sufficiently valuable to require protection. In other words, it should cover only truly proprietary information that is strategically relevant to the firm's competitive position and core competency.
Finally, in terms of process, before a judge can impose an injunction, there should be some evidentiary requirement establishing that the employer has already met a very high standard for enacting measures to protect its business proprietary information. Such measures could include things such as regularly requiring employees to sign confidentiality agreements; seeking and defending legal intellectual property protection for any business information, processes, and knowledge that are subject to federal patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret rules; and limiting which employees have access to full knowledge about key proprietary business processes, secret recipes, and client lists. In order to conserve rare judicial resources, the burden of proof to obtain an injunction based on the doctrine of inevitable disclosure must be sufficiently high to establish that all other mechanisms to protect business information have been attempted and this really is the last resort.
Of the three mechanisms, garden leave seems to be on better ethical grounds in terms of the fairness and equity provided to the departing employee. With garden leave the employer internalizes the cost of enforcing a restriction on employee mobility. Thus, the price mechanism ensures that the potential power-abusing party (the employer) will restrict only behavior that it thinks is truly worth purchasing and creates an incentive to limit the period of mobility prohibition. When the employer willingly, if begrudgingly, bears those costs after the employee leaves, it becomes clearer that removing the employee from the labor market has tangible costs. With garden leave the employer will more likely accurately value the true costs of restricting mobility and have an economic incentive to refrain from overreaching or any vindictive behavior. As compared to the bluntness of a noncompete for restricting unfair competition, garden leave may actually sharpen the focus on the issues related to competitiveness and specific employees' financial value to a firm.
Thus, with garden leave there is an ethically sound balance struck between the individual rights of the employee to restrict the sale of her labor and the employer's protectable interest in curtailing unfair competition. The Lockean concern about abuse of the employee's property rights is alleviated because garden leave creates a market for the employee's services, values them accordingly, and compensates the employee. Like the noncompete negotiation, but now with a market valuation component, the employee retains some power to sell her labor (i.e., choose to work for a competitor) but does so on more balanced terms. Moreover, the incentives align for the employer not to overreach, because it is forced to pay for any immobility it "purchases" during the garden leave period. For these reasons, the concerns about which employees and what information the garden leave captures and restricts appear to become less dire. Just as with noncompetes the employer should disclose the terms that will be required of the employee at the outset, when the parties are negotiating all the relevant aspects of the initial employment or subsequent promotion such as salary and duties, in order to ensure there is no question that an employee fully consents to a garden leave clause. In addition, the garden leave clause could include a mediation requirement in the event of disagreement about its application, which would ensure that open communication, mutual understanding, and negotiation between employers and employees would be prioritized over unilateral or judicially imposed obligations.
CONCLUSION
Legislatures and judges have sought to find the socially optimal balance of the tensions between the desire for freedom of employee mobility and the need to protect business information that creates competitive advantage. Nationwide, legal decisions run the gamut in terms of regulations and rulings permitting or prohibiting employee mobility restraint mechanisms such as noncompetes, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, and garden leave. While these legal opinions or legislative developments may refer generally to concepts such as property rights, utilitarian analyses, and fairness, we hope that this review of the ethical and philosophical bases for these concepts might provide a much-needed context to support -policy development.
Moreover, this analysis helps to address a gap in the literature on the evaluation of ethical issues related to employee mobility restraints. The discussion above may inform the debate on the appropriateness and legitimate scope of these measures. This analysis may support future researchers not only in their work with these specific legal mechanisms but also perhaps more broadly in evaluating property rights, balancing costs and benefits, and determining fairness in the context of a knowledge-based economy.
